Political involvement has long been shown to be a pro…table investment for …rms that seek favorable regulatory conditions or support in times of economic distress. But how important are di¤erent types of political involvement for the timing and magnitude of political support? To answer this question, we take a comprehensive look at the lobbying expenditures and political connections of banks that were recipients of government support under the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). We …nd that politicallyengaged …rms were not only more likely to receive TARP support, but they also received a greater amount of TARP support and received the support earlier than …rms that were not politically involved. JEL Classi…cation: D72; D73; G28
Introduction
Economists have long noted that …rms that lobby or maintain other types of political connections receive a variety of economic bene…ts in return ( Roberts, 1990; Yu and Yu, 2010) . Prior research shows that engagement in the political process might be used as a form of insurance against economic crises. For instance, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) show that …rms with political connections in 35 di¤erent countries are more likely to receive government bailouts in times of economic distress than non-connected …rms. 1 ;2 This study extends this literature by not only examining whether politically connected …rms have a higher likelihood of receiving government support than non-connected …rms, but this study also examines whether connected …rms are more likely to receive support sooner and whether connected …rms are more likely to receive more support than nonconnected …rms.
Using the 2008 troubled asset relief program (hereafter TARP) as a natural experiment, we address three main questions: Did political ties determine the overall distribution of TARP funds? Was the timing of TARP payouts in ‡uenced by …rms' political engagement? And, did political ties in ‡uence the magnitude of TARP payouts?
To answer these questions, we use two approximations for political engagement. First, we follow Yu and Yu (2010) and proxy political engagement with lobbying expenditures.
In particular, we examine lobbying expenditures during the …ve years prior to the passage of TARP. Second, we follow Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) and proxy politcal engagement with the number of political connections a …rm maintains. We obtain data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), which considers a …rm to be politically connected if at least one of the following three conditions applies: (1) the …rm previously employed an individual that is currently employed by the federal government, (2) the …rm currently employs an individual that used to be employed by the federal government,
(3) the …rm currently employs an individual that is concurrently employed by the federal government.
Results in this study are striking. We …nd that …rms that lobbied had a 42 percent higher chance of receiving TARP support than …rms that did not lobby. Firms that received TARP support, spent up to four times as much on lobbying as …rms that did not receive TARP support. Further, our univariate tests show that the fraction of TARP …rms that lobbied is nearly …ve times greater than the fraction of non-TARP …rms that lobbied. In addition, …rms with political connections had a 29 percent higher chance of receiving support than non-connected …rms. In fact, the percentage of TARP …rms that were politically connected is nearly three times greater than the percentage of non-TARP …rms that were politically connected. These results suggest that political engagement is directly related to the distribution of TARP support. 3 In our next set of tests, we examine the length of time between the signing of TARP and a …rm's receipt of TARP funds, which we denote as the timing of TARP for brevity. The allocation of TARP funds were paid out over 33 di¤erent days. All of the eight …rms that received support on the …rst payout date, October 28th, 2008, had lobbied during the …ve years prior to the bailout and all of the …rms were also politically connected.
Of the 15 …rms that received TARP support on the second payout date, November 17th, 2008, …ve had lobbied and four of the …rms were politically connected according to the CRP. We show that nearly 62 percent of …rms that lobbied and received TARP, received the support during the …rst two payouts. Likewise, more than 70 percent of politically connected …rms that received TARP, received support during the …rst two payouts. Ninety-…ve percent of …rms that lobbied received TARP support during the …rst nine payouts while 100 percent of …rms that were politically connected were recipients of TARP funds during the …rst nine payouts.
We use robust econometric techniques to show that …rms that lobbied and/or were politically connected received TARP support sooner than other …rms. In economic terms, …rms that lobbied during the …ve years prior to TARP received support 21:34 percent sooner than …rms that did not lobby. Similarly, our multivariate estimates suggest that …rms with political connections received TARP support 35:37 percent sooner than …rms without connections. Combined with our earlier results, these …ndings suggest that, not only is political engagement related to who received TARP support, but political engagement is also related to when …rms received support.
In our …nal set of tests, we estimate the marginal e¤ect of political engagement on the distribution of TARP funds. First, we …nd that, of the …rms that received TARP support, those that lobbied received between $2:02 and $5:14 billion more in total support than …rms that did not lobby. Similarly, we …nd that …rms with political connections received between $3:08 and $6:47 billion more in TARP support than …rms without political connections. We also test whether …rms that both lobbied and had political connections drive our results. Indeed, we …nd that these …rms received between $3:73 billion and $6:18 billion more in TARP support than …rms that did not have both types of political ties. These results support the idea that corporate political engagement is directly related to the amount of TARP funds received by …rms.
Additional multivariate tests show that for every dollar spent on lobbying during the …ve years prior to TARP, …rms received between $485:77 and $585:65 in TARP support. We then condition these results on …rms that both lobbied and had political connections. Interestingly, we …nd that those …rms that had both lobbied and were politically connected drive our results. For instance, for every dollar spent on lobbying, politically connected …rms received approximately $440 dollars in TARP support.
While our results tend to show that political engagement heavily in ‡uenced the distribution, timing, and magnitude of the TARP bailout, our results are peculiar given that some banks did not want to be bailed out. For instance, the New York Times reported that both BB&T and Wells Fargo protested the manditory acceptance of TARP 3 support. 4 In fact, banks that were bailed out were not at liberty to return the TARP loans until certain standards set by the U.S. Treasury Department were met. If some banks were forced to accept TARP support despite protesting the support generally, other questions regarding the relation between political ties and government bailouts become important. While prior research suggests that the motivation to become politically engaged is to provide a form of insurance during periods of economic crisis ( The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 described the data used in the analysis in more detail. Section 3 reports the results from our empirical tests. Section 4 concludes.
Data
We obtain data on lobbying expenditures for the 237 …nancial …rms that received TARP support from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP 5 Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) show that prior to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act in 1999 there were three di¤erent types of …nancial service PACs that competed in their lobbying e¤orts for legislative support and accordingly showed di¤erent contribution patterns: commercial banks, securities …rms/investment banks, and insurance companies. All three groups matched each other's contributions to legislators who were not members of the House Banking Committee, but they did not match each In addition, we obtain data on political connections from the CRP's Revolving Door database. This database "intends to identify those people whose career trajectory has taken them from Capitol Hill, the White House, and Cabinet o¢ ce suites to K Street, and vice versa." 6 Using these data, we calculate an indicator variable called CONNECT that is equal to unity if a particular …rm has employed, or is currently employing an individual who is also employed or has been employed in the federal government or appointed to a government advisory board, independent commission, or a congressional or presidential cabinet entity.
The …rm-speci…c data used for this analysis come from several sources. From the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP), we obtain daily prices, trading volume, and market capitalizations. We also gather quarterly balance sheet data from Compustat in order to calculate each …rm's debt-to-equity ratio and total assets. From the U.S.
Treasury Department, we gather the list of …nancial institutions that received bailout funds and the date the bailout was received. To obtain a sample of …nancial institutions, we gather, from the universe of publicly traded …rms, companies with a major Standard Industrial Classi…cation Code (SIC) header of 60, 61, and 62. 7 We also require these stocks to have CRSP data. The …nal sample includes 237 …rms that received bailout funds. We also obtain data for 334 …nancial …rms with similar SIC codes that did not receive bailout funds. Table 1 reports summary statistics for …rms in our sample (Panel A). We also report the summary statistics for the 334 …rms that did not receive bailouts (Panel B). The average …rm in Panel A has a stock price (P rice) of $17:12, a market capitalization (Size) of $4:2 billion, assets (T otAssets) of $47:16 billion, and a debt-to-equity (D=E) ratio of 10:48. The average amount of money received from TARP (TARP) is approximately $681 million. We also report share turnover (T urn) and stock return volatility (V olt).
Turnover is the percentage of shares outstanding that are traded each day, while volatility is the standard deviation of daily CAPM residuals. 8 The average …rm in Panel A has a daily turnover of 0:11 percent and a volatility measure of 3:61 percent. LobDU M is an indicator variable that equals one if a …rm has positive lobbying expenditures during other's contributions to members of the same committee. From this research follows the conclusion that within each subgroup, the di¤erent PACs follow similar contribution patterns. 6 Revolving Door: Methodology, retrieved from the world wide web on March 4, 2011: http://www. opensecrets.org/revolving/methodology.php. 7 The Standard Industrial Classi…cation Code System is a system employed by di¤erent US government agencies for classifying industries by a four-digit code. Codes starting with 60 classify banks, 61 classi…es credit agencies, and 62 classi…es security and commodity service providers like brokers, dealers, and exchanges.
the …ve years prior to TARP (2004 to 2008); zero otherwise. We …nd that nearly nine percent of …rms that received TARP also lobbied. Further, of the …rms that lobbied in Panel A, the average company spent (LobDol) $9:1 million on lobbying from 2004 to 2008 and was active in (%Y earsLob) 67:6 percent of these years. When examining the indicator variable CON N ECT , we …nd that over seven percent of …rms that received TARP support currently employ or have employed at least one individual that is also a¢ liated with the government.
Panel B reports the summary statistics for the other …nancial …rms that did not receive bailout dollars. The average …rm in Panel B has a P rice of $17:88, a Size of $1:9 billion, T otAssets of $72:5 billion, a D=E of 13:42, T urn of 0:12 percent, and V olt of 3:75 percent. Of …rms in Panel B that lobbied, we …nd that the mean value for LobDU M is 0:018 while the average …rm has a LobDol value of $2:2 million. We also …nd that the mean value of CON N ECT is 0:024.
Panel C reports the di¤erence in means. We …nd that larger …rms, in terms of market capitalization, were more likely to be bailed out as the di¤erence in Size is $2:274 billion (p-value = 0:05). We show that the LobDU M is signi…cantly larger for …rms that received TARP support than for …rms that did not receive support (di¤erence = 0:0706, p-value = 0:000). In economic terms, LobDU M is nearly …ve times larger in Panel A than in Panel B. We also …nd that the di¤erence in LobDol is signi…cant (di¤erence = $6:88 million, p-value = 0:047). Finally, we report that …rms that received TARP had nearly three times the value of CON N ECT than …rms that did not receive TARP (di¤erence = 0:0477, p-value = 0:011). The di¤erences in the other variables reported in Table 1 are statistically close to zero. The …nding that lobbying is more prevalent for …rms in Panel A than in Panel B is consistent with the argument that lobbying expenditures and political connections help explain which …rms received TARP support as …rms that received bailout dollars spent four times more on lobbying than …rms that did not receive bailout dollars. However, these results must be interpreted with caution because lobbying expenditures are likely related to the size of …rms, which is also di¤erent between samples.
We control for size and other factors that may have in ‡uenced the distribution of TARP funds in multivariate tests below.
Analysis and Results

Who Received TARP Support
The univariate results in Table 1 suggest that both lobbying and political connections are positively related to the payout of TARP. We continue in this direction by estimating the following equation using a Probit regression.
The Second, we de…ne DU M M Y as CON N ECT , which equals unity if …rm i is reported to have political connections according to the CRP. Table 2 reports the results of the probit analysis. In unreported tests, we estimate the cross correlation between the independent variables and …nd that several variables are signi…cantly correlated. We therefore estimate equation (1) using a linear probability model and calculate variance in ‡ation factors to determine the severity of multicollinearity. First, we …nd that the estimates from the linear probability model are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2 . Second, we …nd that the variance in ‡ation factors of the linear probability model are well under four. However, we report a variety of versions of the model to show the robustness of our results to potential multicollinearity bias. We …nd in column 1 that after controlling for P rice, D=E, T urn, and V olt, the estimate for LobDU M is 1:0474. This estimate is statistically signi…cant at the 0:01 level. Below the estimates for the indicator variable, we report the marginal probabilities for the variable DU M M Y (in brackets). We …nd in column 1 that, after controlling for other factors that potentially in ‡uence the level of TARP support, the probability of receiving TARP is 0:3836 if a …rm had lobbied. Column 2 controls for the natural log of market capitalization (ln(Size)) instead of P rice. Again we …nd that the estimate for LobDU M is positive and signi…cant (estimate = 1:1255, p-value = 0:000). The computed marginal probability is 0:4118. We …nd similar results in column 3 when we include the natural log of Assets (ln(T otAssets)) and in column 4 when we include the full model.
In both columns, the estimate for LobDU M is positive and signi…cant and the marginal probability is 0:5105 and 0:3700.
Results in columns 1 through 4 indicate that lobbying during the …ve years prior to TARP signi…cantly increased the probability of receiving TARP support. In columns 5 through 8, we include the indicator variable CON N ECT as our variable of interest. As before, we report various versions of the full model to show that our results are robust to multicollinearity bias. For brevity, we discuss the results of the full model in column 8. We …nd that size (in terms of market capitalization) increased the probability of receiving TARP support. We also show that …rms that were less volatile and had fewer assets were more likely to receive TARP. After including these control variables, we …nd that CON N ECT produces a positive estimate that is both statistically signi…cant (pvalue = 0:029) and economically signi…cant (the marginal probability for CON N ECT in column 8 is 0:2351). Similar results are found in columns 5 through 7. These results support the …ndings in columns 1 through 4 and our univariate results in Table 1 , which show a direct relation in the level of political engagement and the likelihood of receiving TARP support.
The Timing of the TARP Payout
In Tables 1 and 2, we document that political engagement -measured by lobbying expenditures and political connections -increases the likelihood that a …rm received TARP support. Throughout the remainder of the paper, we focus only on …rms that received TARP funds. In this subsection, we examine the timing of TARP payouts for those …rms.
In the following subsections, we investigate the variability in the amount of TARP funds received by …rms while controlling for our measures of political engagement. Table 3 reports the date of the TARP payout, the number of …rms receiving the payout, the sum of the total payout on each day, the number of …rms that lobbied and received support, and the number of …rms that received support and had political connections according to the CRP. In column 1, we …nd that the TARP payout took place over 33 days beginning Table 3 suggest that the …rms that were politically active 8
were among the …rst …rms to receive TARP support. However, these results should be interpreted with caution as other factors in ‡uencing the payout of TARP are not controlled for.
Next we control for other factors that may have in ‡uenced the timing of the payout of TARP. We estimate the following equation for the 237 …rms that received support.
The Because the dependent variable is discrete and counts the days since the signing of TARP, we use the appropriate count regression framework. The Poisson regression requires a distribution such that the mean is equal to its variance. The mean of T imeT oT arp, however, is 98, while the variance is over 3; 600. We estimate this dispersion using maximum likelihood and …nd dispersion estimates that range from 0:1560 to 0:1642, which are signi…cantly greater than zero. These estimates suggest that the dependent variable is over-dispersed and therefore the distributional assumptions of the Poisson regression are violated. We therefore estimate equation (2) using a negative binomial regression and report the results in Table 4 . We do note that in unreported tests, we use both OLS while controlling for robust standard errors (White, 1980) and a Poisson regression. Estimates obtained from these alternative speci…cations are qualitatively similar to those reported in this study. In addition, variance in ‡ation factors from the OLS regression are well below four. However, as before, we report a variety of versions of the model to show robustness to potential multicollinearity.
In other tests, we attempt to use the Cox Proportional Hazard model that is common when analyzing survival data or duration models. We conduct a series of tests 9 to determine whether the proportionality assumption, which is required for consistent
Hazard estimates, holds in our data. When estimating equation (2) Because the proportionality assumption is violated according to these tests, we rely on the negative binomial regression estimates in Table 4 . For brevity, we only discuss the …ndings of the full models reported in column 4 in each of the panels. As can be seen in Table 4 , the results in the other columns are generally similar. 9 Column 4 shows that, after controlling for other factors that might in ‡uence the timing of the payout of TARP, the estimate for LobDU M is negative (estimate = 0:2400, p-value = 0:048) suggesting that lobbying …rms waited fewer days to receive TARP support than non-lobbying …rms did . Column 4 in Panel B reports the results when we include CON N ECT instead of LobDU M . The indicator variable CON N ECT also produces a signi…cantly negative estimate (estimate = 0:4365, p-value = 0:000). These results indicate that politically connected …rms received TARP support sooner than …rms without political connections. In Panel C, we interact the two indicator variables to determine whether the combination of lobbying and political connectedness drive the results. In each of the columns, we do not …nd interaction estimates that are statistically di¤erent from zero. For instance, column 4 reports an interaction estimate that, while negative, is statistically close to zero (estimate = 0:2085, p-value = 0:665).
To determine the economic signi…cance of the estimates we transform the negative binomial estimates into percentage di¤erences. In particular, the percentage di¤erence between …rms that lobbied (or had political connections) and those that did not is obtained by using the expression 100 exp j 1, where j is either 8 or 9 . In Panel A column 4, the percentage di¤erence is 21:34 indicating that …rms that lobbied received TARP support 21:34 percent sooner than …rms that did not lobby. Similarly, in Panel B column 4, the percentage di¤erence is 35:37 percent suggesting that …rms with political connections received support 35.37 percent sooner than …rms without political connections. This exercise helps verify that the estimates reported in Table 4 are not only statistically signi…cant but are also economically signi…cant. The multivariate results in Table 4 o¤er support for the conclusions we draw in Table 3 , which suggest that …rms that were politically engaged not only were more likely to receive TARP support, but they were also more likely to receive support sooner than …rms that were not politically engaged.
Explanations of the Level of TARP Support
Next, we begin to determine whether lobbying expenditures and political connections relate directly to the amount of TARP support received by …rms in a multivariate setting.
We begin by estimating the following equation using cross-sectional data for the 237 …rms that received TARP.
The dependent variable is the amount of dollars (in billions) received by …rm i as part of TARP. The independent variables include P rice, ln (Size), ln (T otAssets), D=E, T urn, and V olt, which have each been de…ned previously. The variables of interest are the variables LobDU M , CON N ECT , and the interaction between the two variables. The regression results are reported in Table 5 . We report the OLS estimates and p-values (in parentheses) that are obtained from White (1980) robust standard errors. 10 To determine whether the results in Table 5 su¤er from multicollinearity, we estimate variance in ‡ation LobDU M . The control variables produce estimates that are generally consistent with our expectations. For instance, column 2 shows that ln (Size) is positively related to the amount of TARP support received by …rms. Similarly, column 3 shows that ln (T otAssets) is directly related to the amount of TARP support received. We also …nd some evidence in columns 1 through 3 that …rms with high D=E ratios, lower share turnover, and higher idiosyncratic volatility received a greater amount of TARP support. These latter results are not robust to each alternative speci…cation, however. The variable of interest LobDU M produces positive estimates consistently across columns 1 through 3. In fact, the estimate for LobDU M in column 1 suggests that …rms that lobbied received $5:14 billion more in TARP support than …rms that did not lobby. These results hold in the full model in column 4 although the magnitude of the estimate decreases. Column 4 suggests that …rms that lobbied still received $2:02 billion more in TARP support than …rms that did not lobby, however. The estimate for LobDU M is statistically signi…cant at the 0:01 level. Combined with results in Tables 1 and 2 that suggest that the level of lobbying expenditures is directly related to the likelihood of …rms receiving TARP support, Table 5 indicates that, of the …rms that received TARP, those that lobbied received substantially more than those that did not lobby.
We next turn our attention to Panel B. The variable of interest in this panel is the indicator variable CON N ECT . In each of these columns, the estimate for CON N ECT is positive and signi…cant. In column 1, the estimate is 6:47 suggesting that …rms with political connections -according to the Center for Responsive Politics -received $6:47 billion more in TARP support than …rms without political connections. As before, the magnitude of the estimate for CON N ECT decreases when we include size and total assets as control variables. The estimate for CON N ECT is still 3:08 and statistically signi…cant at the 0:01 level in column 4, however. In economic terms, the estimate for CON N ECT in column 4 indicates that …rm with political connections received $3:08 billion more in TARP support than …rms without political connections.
Next, we interact the two indicator variables to determine the combined e¤ect of lobbying and political connections. Panel C shows the results from this interaction. Interestingly, we …nd that …rms that both lobbied and were politically connected received $6:18 billion more TARP support than other …rms in column 1 (p-value = 0:014). In column 4, after controlling for all other factors, …rms that both lobbied and were politically connected received $3:89 billion more in TARP than other …rm. The interaction estimate is statistically signi…cant at the 0:10 level (p-value = 0:060). We note that in columns 1 through 4 the dummy variables LobDU M and CON N ECT produce estimates that are statistically close to zero, which indicates that …rms that both lobbied and were politically connected drive our results in Panels A and B.
Thus far, we have only examined the relationship between TARP support and an indicator variable determining whether a …rm has lobbied. Our …nal set of tests examines the relation between lobbying expenditures and the level of TARP support. In particular, we estimate the following equation for the 237 …rms that received TARP support.
The dependent variable and the independent variables have been de…ned previously.
However, instead of including LobDU M , we include the continuous variable LobDol, which is equal to the amount of lobbying expenditures for each …rm that received TARP support. Similar to equation (3), we include CON N ECT as well as the interaction between CON N ECT and LobDol to determine whether the positive relationship between
LobDol and TARP is driven by …rms that lobby and have political connections. The variables of interest are LobDol and the interaction between LobDol and CON N ECT .
We again report the OLS estimates and p-values (in parentheses) obtained from White (1980) robust standard errors although similar results are found when controlling for clustering in the error term. Similar to previous tests, we report a variety of versions of the model to show the robustness of our results. Panel A of Table 6 reports the results when excluding the variable CON N ECT and the interaction variable, while Panel B
reports the results when including these two additional variables. As before, we estimate variance in ‡ation factors to determine the severity of multicollinearity. The unreported variance in ‡ation factors in columns 1 through 3 of Panel A and columns 1 through 3
of Panel B are well below four. However, in column 4 of both panels, variance in ‡ation factors are close to 10 for ln (Size) and ln (T otAssets) and should therefore be interpreted with caution. As a measure of robustness, we again report various speci…cations of equation (4) to show that our results hold whether we control for size and assets simultaneously, or not.
Column 1 of Panel A shows that, after controlling for other factors that in ‡uence the payout of TARP, the estimate for LobDol is 585:65 (p-value = 0:000). In economic terms, this estimate suggests that for every dollar of lobbying expenditures, …rms received to TARP was more than $485 in TARP support.
Columns 1 through 4 of Panel B report the results when including both CON N ECT and the interaction between LobDol and CON N ECT . Column 5 shows that the interaction estimate is 417:99 (p-value = 0:032) suggesting that every dollar spent on lobbying by …rms that were politically connected resulted in nearly $418 dollar of TARP support.
Similar results are found in columns 2 through 4. These results indicate that that our …nding that lobbying expenditures are directly related to the amount of TARP support received by …rms is driven by …rms that are politically connected. Again we note that the variable LobDol produces estimates that are statistically close to zero in columns 1 through 4 of Panel B suggesting that the e¤ect of lobbying expenditures on the amount of TARP support received is primarily driven by …rms with political connections.
Robustness
We recognize an important potential bias in our results. Our results in Tables 5 and 6 may be driven by potential sample selection bias as some …rms may not …nd it optimal to lobby thus violating the random sampling assumption required for consistent estimation.
Furthermore, endogeneity might be a¤ecting our results. We re-estimate equations (3) and (4) using the Heckman correction to account for both sample selection bias and endogeneity. This correction uses a two-stage approach wherein the …rst stage is a limited dependent variable estimation of the conditional probability that …rm i lobbied given X, where X is a vector of control variables. More speci…cally, we …rst estimate the following equation using a probit model.
where LobDU M has been de…ned previously and is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. We include in X: P rice, Size, T otAssets, D=E, T urn, and V olt.
In the next stage, we include a transformation of these predicted probabilities to estimate a general model that is similar to equations (3) and (4). Speci…cally, we estimate the following:
where TARP has been de…ned previously and X includes the control variables mentioned above. We specify the Heckman correction in general terms because, as noted previously, several variables included in X are strongly correlated with one another. We therefore include a variety of di¤erent combinations of control variables when accounting for the correction, in order to assure that our results are robust to sample selection bias. The results from these robustness tests are not reported in this paper. We …nd, however that, in general, lobbying expenditures and political connections have strong explanatory power for TARP payouts. For instance, replicating Table 6 column 4 and including all independent variables in X when estimating both equation (5) and equation (6), we …nd that the average estimate for LobDol in the second stage of the Heckman correction is 450:05. In each speci…cation that we report in Table 6 , the estimates for LobDol are statistically signi…cant at the 0:01 level. The results from these tests indicate that the …ndings reported above are robust to sample selection corrections and potential endogeneity.
We also note another important characteristic of equations (3) and (4). If endogeneity biases our estimates, our estimates are still asymptotically consistent. For instance, if the lobbying variables or the political connection variables are indeed correlated with the error terms, this correlation is not contemporaneous. In addition, the error term accounts for the amount of TARP received by …rm i on the date of receipt. However, the lobbying variables and the political connection variables are measured before the receipt date. Even if the results we report Tables 5 and 6 su¤er from endogeneity bias, at a minimum our estimates are still asymptotically consistent.
Based on our discussion in the introduction, some banks protested the acceptance of TARP funds and were not allowed to pay back TARP loans until certain U.S. Treasury standards were met. In other unreported tests, we control for payback as an independent variable The idea here is control for the likelihood that …rms that were …rst able to payback the loans according to Treasury standards are not driving the relation between political engagement and characteristics related to the distribution of TARP. We include an indicator variable equal to unity if the bank had paid back TARP loans by the end of the 2009. The indicator variable captures …rms that were able to repay the TARP loans the quickest based on the standards set by the Treasury. We replicate our entire multivariate analysis while including this variable and …nd that the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the version of the study. These unreported results suggest that our results are not a¤ected by …rms that were quickest to repay the TARP loans.
Conclusion
Faccio et al. (2006) show that …rms with political connections are more likely to receive corporate bailouts than …rms without political connections suggesting that political engagement might be a form of insurance during periods of economic crises. In this paper, we examine whether the level of political engagement determined the allocation, timing, and the magnitude of TARP funds during the recent economic crisis. In particular, we extend the literature by testing whether corporate political engagement was important in determining which …rms received support, under what is to this date the largest government bailout in U.S. history. Second, we test whether political engagement also determined the timing of the payout of TARP. Third, we examine whether political ties in ‡uence the amount of TARP support received by …rms. We approximate political engagement in two ways: First, we obtain lobbying expenditures for each …rm during the …ve years prior to TARP. Second, we use the de…nition of political connections given by the Center for Responsive Politics. We examine the e¤ect of these approximations of political engagement on the distribution of TARP for a sample of 237 …rms that received support and 334 …nancial …rms that did not receive support.
Our multivariate results are striking. After controlling for other factors that may have in ‡uenced the distribution of TARP funds, our probit analysis suggests that …rms that lobbied during the …ve years prior to TARP had between a 37 to 51 percent better chance of receiving TARP support. Similarly, we …nd that politically connected …rms had a 23:5 to 39:3 percent better chance of receiving TARP support. These results con…rm …ndings in Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2010) .
In other tests, we examine how soon …rms that were politically engaged received TARP support. Our results suggest that both lobbying expenditures during the …ve years prior to TARP and political connections are directly related to the timing of bailout decisions. For instance, while TARP was paid out over 33 installments, we …nd that 62 percent of …rms that lobbied during the …ve years prior to TARP received bailout funds in the …rst two payouts. Further, nearly 71 percent of …rms with political connections received support in the …rst two payouts. We also …nd that 95 (100) percent of …rms that lobbied (with political connections) received TARP support during the …rst nine payouts.
Our regression analysis shows that …rms that lobbied were more likely to receive TARP support 21.34 percent sooner than …rms that did not lobby. Further, …rms with political connections were more likely to receive support 35.37 percent sooner than …rms without political connections.
Our …nal set of tests examines the amount of TARP support received by each …rm while conditioning on our approximations of political engagement. First, our multivariate analysis shows that …rms that lobbied received between $2:02 billion and $5:14 billion more in TARP support than …rms that did not lobby. Further, we …nd that …rms with political connections received between $3:08 billion and $6:47 billion more in TARP funds than …rms without political connections. Second, we show that for every dollar spent on lobbying, …rms received between $485:77 and $585:65 in TARP support. This result is primarily driven by …rms with political connections.
Combined, our results indicate that political engagement is not only directly related to the likelihood of receiving TARP support, but political engagement is also related to both the timing and magnitude of support. These …ndings seem to indicate that political engagement was an important determinant in the distribution of TARP funds. However, media outlets reported instances where several banks protested the manditory acceptance of the TARP funds. If …rms become politically engaged as a form of insurance during periods of economic crises, then why were some …rms forced to be bailed out? Because the motivation behind the bailout is unobserved, we are left to speculate why our results
show that political engagement apparently had such a profound e¤ect on the distribution of TARP. Perhaps banks that vocally protested the bailout were much more willing to accept TARP support then they let on and their protest was intended to be a positive signal to shareholders. Or, perhaps forced government intervention is more likely to be easier with …rms that have relationships with government o¢ cials. Regardless of the answer to these questions, the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program provides a unique look into the complexities of relation between political engagement and large bailouts. The table rep orts statistics that describ e the sam ple. In particular, panel A rep orts the results for the 237 …rm s that received bailout dollars while panel B shows the results for …nancial …rm s that did not receive bailout dollars. We rep ort the CRSP price (P rice ), the m arket capitalization (S ize ), the total assets in m illions rep orted on Com pustat (TotA ssets ), the Com pustat Debt-to-Equity Ratio (D /E ), the share turnover (Turn ), which is the m onthly CRSP volum e scaled by shares outstanding, and the idiosyncratic volatility (Volt ), which is the standard deviation of the residuals from the daily CAPM regressions. We obtain data regarding the lobbying exp enditures from the Center for Resp onsive Politics (CPR). LobD um is a dum my variable equal to one if …rm i lobbied during the …ve years prior to TARP. LobD ol is the am ount of lobbying exp enditures for …rm s that lobbied. C onnect is a dum my variable equal to one if …rm i has p olitical connections according to the CPR. In panel A, LobD ol represents the numb er of dollars sp ent by …rm s that b oth lobbied during the last …ve years and received bailout dollars. Of the 237 …rm s that received bailout m oney, 21 of the …rm s sp end m oney on lobbying. In panel B, LobD ol is the numb er of dollars sp ent by …rm s that lobbied during the last …ve years but did not receive bailout m oney. Of the 334 …rm s that did not receive bailout dollars, only 10 …rm s sp ent m oney on lobbying. The table rep orts the dates of bailout, the numb er of …rm s that received bailout m oney, the sum of the bailout am ount that was paid out on that day, the numb er of …rm s that lobbied during the last …ve years, and the numb er of …rm s that had p olitical connections according to the Center for Resp onsive Politics. Table 4 Negative Binomial Regressions Table 5 Cross-Sectional Regressions Table 6 Cross-Sectional Regressions
